companies. c-span, 45 years and counting. powered by cable. >> since 1979, in partnership with the cable industry, c-span has provided complete coverage of the halls of congress. from the house and senate floors to congressional hearings, party briefings, and committee meetings. c-span gives you a front row seat to how issues are debated and decided. with no commentary, no interruptions, and completely unfiltered. c-span, your unfiltered view of government. >> coming up, a conversation about defense priorities for the united states and lithuania with u.s. ambassador to nato, julian smith, and lithuania's defense minister. they talk about the russia ukraine war and other global

security challenges. the discussion was hosted by the atlantic council. >> back to business birthday priorities for 2024 nato summit in washington. i'm vice president and senior director of the atlanta council scowcroft certainty for strategy and security. the north atlantic alliance turned 75 this april. and there is much to celebrate. the alliance is larger and more united than ever before. the accession of finland and sweden added few militaries to nato's roster to the roster and new defense plan and after decades of underfunding, n.a.t.o. supported ukraine in recognition of the mounting russian threat. these causes for celebration, however, are juxtaposed with a deteriorating security environment including russia's illegal war of aggression

against ukraine and a collection of unfinished business from last year' summit. so securing the future of the most successful alliance will require this year's summit to be one of implementation. come july, n.a.t.o. will be expected to take action for the underequipped industrial base and frank and demonstration of plans for new challenges including respond the area responsibility. how will this feature in the washington summit agenda? what will allies need to deliver to assure the alliance is able to defend every inch of n.a.t.o. territory. today's discussion will be preview ahead of what is expected to be a pivotal summit offering the transatlantic alliance and decision makers, tans tangible courses of

action. the summit is in less than 100 days, stay tuned for even more of us over the coming weeks-- more from us. and sustainable nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the united states and its allies. the center honors the general's service and body of ethos of nonpartisan commitment of cause and allies and partners, and dedication to the mentorship of the next generation of leaders. joining us today to share their perspectives includes minister of national defense for the republics and lithuania. and the julianne smith, an ambassador to the united states, and an ambassador of the ukraine to the united states. and ambassador the principal deputy assistant secretary of

state for euro asian affairs. and deputy chief of mission of charges of affair at the embassy republic of germany to the united states and mr. james rosco deputy head of mission at the british embassy in washington. the atlantic council would like to thank the lithuanian department of defense, our partners in the conference, we're shaping the future together with allies and partners. nowhere is our mission more important than conversations like this one. throughout today's discussions there will be time to ask questions in person or via ac.org. we encourage you to join the conversation, #stronger with allies. i'd like to turn to the minister for remarks. the minister appointed to the position in march of 2024 and previously served on the national security and defense

security of the lithuanian department. it's our distinct pleasure to host him on his first visit to the united states. the floor is yours. welcome. [applause] >> thank you very much. lithuanian minister of defense is looking forward to the council and looking forward to a deeper one. so, about upcoming summits, about russia and about the eastern flanks. first of all, i would say a few words about russia's capabilities as potential now to challenge n.a.t.o.'s eastern flank. i think last year we had some

movement in the proceedings. and underestimating russia's ability to adapt. what we need to say, two things, russia with their economy and their war both, and many examples when they are moving forward. for example, before the war in ukraine, they produced 3, 400,000, now producing 2.2 million. it is despite sanctions and despite our attempts. so, we are on the war mode. sometimes we are hearing the questions, okay. but it cannot last long in that

such kind of mode, but i think sometimes we apply western criteria, western thinking criteria to russia and it's not adequate because we don't hear about the social welfare. we don't care about any social things of society because society is manipulated, society is socially engineered. and of course, because of opportunity and regime. so when you want to understand rush is a you should not apply western thinking. and it's not necessarily the strategy thinking of russia. second thing which we also saw, so-called mobilization reserve and create a so call-- -- paying for people in russia and attract them to war. and 25 million, this is the number when we ask how many

mobilizations russia can have, 25 million, compared to us and compared to ukraine, which is a big number. this is what we need to understand, we are preparing. the problem is, that when we try to tackle this challenge, we always we're counting how many years we need, three, five, seven, you know, many interpretations, many countings. i think we should change that approach. we should build our defense in that mode and manner in eastern flank in the whole of n.a.t.o. to control the process. so do not recount their years, but to control the process and to deter them. that's why n.a.t.o. decisions are so important. and i want to say what their moves and actions and directions, after madrid world

summit, i think it's in a positive one. it's a positive one. first of all, of course, new defense plans. i think it's a breakthrough. so we transform from deterrence by punishment concept to deterrence by denial. especially after european when you say there is nothing to take back. we need to fight on the line and we need to be ready to fight on the line and deter on the line. that's why we need to have a credible defense in and based on principles forward defense. and the plans, together with enforcement is a good direction to act. we need to tackle still the problems, as you know, capability gaps, air defense, many capabilities, long strike

capabilities, but little by little we are moving forward. it's secure, and important for us eastern flank will be much more flexible responding to risk. when the capability is showed whatever crisis coming, we need to react for veterans. not fighting forward as russia, but to deter them. that's why we need flexible decisions, flexible response and more authority, more power for security is very, very important and i will say, we also moving little by little toward this direction. we need exercises based on article five. with the transatlantic reenforcement, i think it's also would be very important. so acceptability of the defense plans. this is number one what we

need, what we need to do. second thing, second point, is of course, defense investment and defense production. i will not say anything, you know it very well. we're trying and also europe is trying. we increased our production about 50%. we of course, europe is not on the war stage economy, but we're trying to find the solutions. also lithuania, also in europe. we agreed with 2% is only for different spending and we should try to transform the money into the capabilities. how to do it in a faster way, it's still a big, big challenge because even now, you have contract somewhere for ammunition, for the weapons, even if you have the money now, it comes in four years.

it's not like in russia, as we know. ... >> so of course the defense industrial base, we should improve here as much as possible. talking about defense architecture, i should mention i think very important decision made by germany and lithuania. we have germany roadmap implement a step-by-step your i think it's a role model eastern flank countries for what kind of forward defense architecture we should build in eastern flank.

but, of course, it was only the united states of america, in europe in eastern flank. so that's why when we are doing with the germany, the same, your presence -- troops and baltics in lithuania is vital for us. it's a vital factor of defense. you know, , i can see even one joke. i have -- with many -- not the baltics, senior expert analyst and some generals from western countries. and then my colleague from nordic countries, like questions who's stronger? tiger or a leopard or something like this. he tells me, which army in europe is the strongest? the general said america.

no, no. in europe. we know america is the strongest. no, he said, america. so even in europe, american forces is the strongest forces. so that's why america is so vital for security. but, of course, as you see you are also investing in our defense, taking responsibility, taking actions also important. and i think germany is doing great job in eastern flank. third point, air defense. we need to great antiquated system. we know very well in our defense capabilities has a good deficit in nato. so producing the air defense, long-range, medium-range, short range, it's vital. that's why know we and lithuania also a little bit shifting our priorities i would say. we're trying to make have here,

creating the tank battalions step-by-step it also investing more into a middle range air defense system which could help to defend not only are armories but our citizens in the cities as we see in ukraine how it is vital. fourth thing, thinking about defense architecture, its ukrainian aspirations. we know very well. [speaking ukrainian] fighting not only for themselves, their fighting for europe. and just ask for ammunition. they're not asking for troops, so give them tools to fight and to control and to contain the empire. it's so simple. it's like if you want, do not send the troops summative and the native country, most

cheapest way to give weapons and ammunition to ukraine. simple as that. it's that simple and political situation embassy. talking about nato and ukraine relations, i know it's difficult. at the same time we should not give to russia informal power on nato. no foreign country should have such kind of right. should also be based on that assumption. fifth point, it's nato in the pacific. i think the processes and the situations are interconnected. and i think we should also do more in close cooperation between two regions, especially thinking how to contain and

control the authoritarian regimes reach which are interconnected between themselves as an over well. so those of the main five points, and for the last thing but also i would say important one, i want to talk about puzzle which called escalation de-escalation thinking. i know that sometimes very much restrict some moves especially in the nato, thinking that support to ukraine. you know, doing nothing is -- we should put in mind because it is russia. if you will just, you know, think that you will not do anything, they will consider it as you are peaceful now. we will take and break you. respect only if you're strong. very simple thing. its strength. you know it very well, classical

things. so that's why we need to escape from this dilemma, which russia is trying to play with us. that's what we need active defense. sometimes even creating for russia also not only their dilemma but our dilemmas for them. thank you. [applause] [inaudible] >> thoughtful comment, and i believe i know you have a busy schedule i think with time for least a few questions. so i wanted to start with the threat of harm it because i think some in the united states might say well, russia turned out to be weaker than we thought. it has its hands full and ukraine. putin is not foolish enough to attack a nato ally anytime soon. but you are right there on the front lines. so can you share with us what are the realities of the secure

situation on nato speaker and and the russian threat? >> several factors. that, if you look at kaliningrad now, even less than what was before the war. does it deliver to ukraine. but at the same time we know what these forces, could be reinforced. you know, a new reform, army form in western district in 22 december to transform the brigade to division level. and if you look at the capability to do it in personal level, we can do it very well. war and also is capable maybe not very much sophisticated but to contribute the technical equipment for that kind of, building that kind of new --

that's what we can get very fast. as totalitarian country can do very fast. that's what we should adopt. adaptation of course is defense which i talked a little bit. another important factor is belarus. we don't see belarus as independent country. it's already integrated in domains of russia, especially military terms. and also i remember one conversation with some ukrainians before the war. in 2014, one keep your creams at the time was -- was also after maidan to attack. you were saying president, could you give me guarantee? but unit, russia will not use

territory. officially yes, of course where independent state. after some drinks, he asked the same question and he told him i will inform you in 48 hours. it was in 2014, i don't know how many hours now. that's why we do not, we do not see them as independent country. and it's also an important factor. but, of course, if you look at another special problem could be -- if you talk about conventional threats come from divisional war comes of course intelligence, you know, we have capability for early warning system. but for no notice or short notice, something hybrid, below article number five we should always be prepared for that kind of thing. as you know we already survived one of attacks, so-called allies

integration. luke schenker pushed people in our borders many to adapt to the -- lukashenko -- also could be barriers. we need to be ready for that. >> that makes sense and you talked about the need then to have the proper defense and deterrence architecture as to the vilnius summit lester the new regional plans were agreed to, kind of the first series new defense plans are early since the end of the cold war. there been some public reporting that we don't yet have the capabilities that we need for these plans do we have what we need to defend nato's eastern flank? if not, what are the biggest gaps in your? >> i think we are but recaps you said. air defense, heavy division so tanks, artillery systems, deep strike capabilities. i think we have a list of so-called gaps, but the gaps you

can control. if we're moving forward, for defense, there is new energy. i think we can find the solutions. but your most important thing, america and europe. america security of your -- without america security of your is impossible. that's what we're doing our stuff, we know what we should invest in our defense, and we're doing, our aim is 3%. is 3%. we sit in the baltics 3%, not tonight. in the baltics we see 3% and we will achieve i think this year. so that's why we're doing a lot of -- but at the same time we send a message to united states what, you know, when you did also. that's president of the united states in europe is biggest and most credible factor. >> i've had the opportunity to visit with lithuania and meet with the german and american commits